The Existential-Internal Threats for Taiwan to Prepare Contingencies Against

Operation Spider’s Web by Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) in Russia and Rising Lion by Israel’s intelligence agency, the Mossad, in Iran changed the face of warfare forever. Infiltrating behind enemy lines, the GUR and Mossad enacted critical wartime objectives by incapacitating Russian strategic bombers and Iranian ballistic missiles and launchers, respectively.

Undoubtedly, both major intelligence operations will have far-reaching consequences in other conflicts, such as the Taiwan Strait. Unlike Israel and Ukraine, Taiwan may not have the luxury or capabilities of scathing attacks against China in the event of war. Instead, it’s China that possesses the capabilities to infiltrate Taiwan and decapitate the island nation’s infrastructure and defenses before a U.S. military intervention can take place.

Taiwan is at Risk of Suffering Surprise Attacks that Ukraine and Israel Implemented

China has spent decades preparing contingencies for annexing Taiwan, either through strong-arming diplomatic negotiations or military force. China’s espionage agency, the Ministry of State Security (MSS), has built a wide array of networks embedded inside both Taiwan and the United States to find weak points in defenses, bribe politicians, and enact sabotage if given the green light.

Going back to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, Russian forces had more success in the South than in the North and East. The objectives reached in the South were due to years of infiltration and the presence of fifth column pro-Russian Ukrainians in prominent positions, who had lied about defensive fortifications or had localized units withdraw or stand down. Today, Russia’s key foothold in Ukraine remains in the South, and China would look to enact similar methods upon Taiwan.

Indeed, spying and espionage are a main concern in Taiwan as Taipei has arrested and indicted numerous military officers and staff of party officials for spying for Beijing. Furthermore, Beijing is growing its hybrid and cyber warfare capabilities, which could be enacted if President Xi Jinping orders a preemptive strike and amphibious assault on Taiwan.

Ideally, MSS agents and operatives embedded inside Taiwan will look to target and incapacitate critical infrastructure, anti-ship/air defenses, and command and control structures to try to force Taipei to capitulate before a direct American intervention could take place. Taiwan’s primary goal will be to resist a blockade or invasion until direct American intervention; or to deter China from attempting the unthinkable by mitigating espionage and breaking up pro-Beijing cells.

Mitigating Espionage and Growing Counterintelligence Efforts

Taipei’s hurdles to mitigate Chinese infiltration remain a key concern, as any island security hampered by spies could be damaging to the outcome of a PLA invasion. Nevertheless, proper vetting and perhaps a strong focus on maritime goods can mitigate a “shock and awe” as seen with Israeli and Ukrainian intelligence operations. Taiwan can take key efforts to subvert China’s spy network and bolster its asymmetrical defenses.

Taiwan’s main intelligence agency, the National Security Bureau (NSB), should wargame scenarios of shock and awe attempts that the MSS, and their network, could conduct in the country. Critical areas will come under threat from saboteurs as demonstrated by Spider’s Web and Rising Lion.

Taiwan’s last remaining nuclear power plant was shut down in May 2025, which could enhance China’s advantageous position and espionage efforts. NSB will need to prioritize the protection of Taiwan’s energy grids, production, and water stations from potential infiltrations, as China could use its military (PLA) to enact a blockade, knowing that Taipei’s energy reserves could be affected in the future.

Another flashpoint of infiltration could be port shipping, due to various factors, including Taiwan’s hurdles in clamping down on smuggling and the powerful criminal underground. In a June 2025 War on the Rocks article, analysts Michael A. Hunzeker and Yuster Yu noted how China could sneak in drones and explosives via maritime trade that could go to their cells in Taiwan. This method was similarly used by Ukraine and Israel, which the NSB will need to put a greater emphasis on.

Contingencies for Allowing More Freedom to Field Grade Officers and Dispersing Authority

Taiwan’s former intelligence chief, Liu Te-Laing, estimates that China currently has a spy network of 5,000 individuals in the country. What makes this figure particularly concerning is that the 5,000 is a low estimate, and it could take several years to gather sufficient evidence to convict potential spies. Because of this, Taipei should adopt a doctrine of expanding operational freedom to mid-level intelligence operatives and field-grade officers for key contingencies to defend Taiwan.

One of the flaws of Taiwan’s military (ROC Armed Forces) is that, since Chiang Kai-shek’s founding, orders and command have remained top-heavy due to the old authoritarian structure. Experience for field commanders, or enlisted non-commissioned officers such as (NCOs), and adapting Western island defense doctrines, such as those seen by the UK, can be beneficial in lowering the risk of decapitation strikes.

Planning a concrete line of succession and operational command will also be critical for Taipei, as any MSS cell could be activated for assassinations of Taiwanese political and military leadership. By giving more leeway to mid-level politicians, such as emergency rescue, police commissioners, and transportation chiefs along with regimental and battalion commanders, Taipei can remain in the fight without overt panic if Beijing were to conduct an operation akin to Rising Lion.

Lastly, the Taiwanese government and NSB should prioritize and emphasize counterintelligence more than cross-strait intelligence. China is aware that the United States and Taiwan conduct rigorous war games in various scenarios of a PLA amphibious invasion or blockade. Therefore, the MSS could use its knowledge and operatives attuned to this to strike key blows.

Having already established growing partnerships with the United States and Japan, both of which possess key intelligence capabilities against China, Taiwan can focus more on internal security gaps. This would reconstitute a more dispersed operational structure and allocate more funds and resources to clamp down on infiltrators.

Conclusion

The best defense against growing PLA threats is to reinvigorate counterintelligence capabilities in Taiwan. Focusing on diversifying assets, stronger vetting for personnel in key sectors, and wargaming potential infliction points Beijing may look to strike will be critical for Taipei’s defense. Furthermore, establishing a clear line of succession, allowing ROC field officers greater freedom to act, and focusing on domestic vulnerabilities that China’s spy network could exploit will be crucial to maintaining a defensive posture if Beijing were to decide on military action against the Republic.

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