Strategic Sabotage: Special Operations Forces Core Mission?

Introduction

This essay argues that strategic sabotage must be a SOF core activity to win future conflicts. The Global War on Terror (GWOT) created a SOF community that is used to being the supported entity. SOF dismantled terrorist networks with support from conventional forces who held the advantage within their domains. Those roles will reverse in a large-scale conventional conflict. Conventional forces will be the supported entity and will not hold the same advantages they did during GWOT. SOF’s role will be to use its core activities to enable conventional forces to win. Strategic sabotage is a means to fill this role and must be incorporated as a SOF core activity.

This work proceeds in four parts. First, it examines the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) core activities and how they do not prioritize strategic sabotage. Second, it defines strategic sabotage and proposes it as a core activity. Third, it examines a modern case study illustrating this necessity. Fourth, it sums up the argument that strategic sabotage must be a USSOCOM core activity to succeed in future conflicts.

USSOCOM Core Activities

USSOCOM lists twelve SOF core activities that define SOF’s role in the United States joint force. Two relate to strategic sabotage: Direct Action and Unconventional Warfare (UW). USSOCOM defines Direct Action as “Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions employing specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets.” Direct Action appears to include strategic sabotage. However, the activity’s emphasis is inadequate. This definition is tactical in nature. It focuses specialized, short-duration capabilities on targets without regard for strategic effects. Strategic sabotage should require long-term activities to disrupt enemy systems. It could also need multiple targets to effectively disrupt a system. This requires strategic and persistent SOF efforts to accomplish intended effects. Direct Action’s definition is insufficient to encompass strategic sabotage.

USSOCOM defines UW as “actions to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power.” This definition also appears to include strategic sabotage. Historical cases support this. Jedburgh teams in World War II organized resistance groups in France to frustrate plans and disrupt enemy decision options. However, it is insufficient to reduce strategic sabotage to a UW function. Strategic sabotage becomes secondary when the core activity focuses on raising the resistance. It must be an independent strategic tool that receives its own emphasis. UW becomes a means to enable strategic sabotage. Planners can focus on sabotage as an action with surrogate forces as an option alongside other SOF. USSOCOM’s core activities do not accomplish strategic sabotage in large-scale conventional conflict.

Strategic Sabotage

Strategic sabotage must be a defined USSOCOM core activity. It should be defined as specialized military actions against strategic targets to disrupt adversary systems, create dilemmas, target critical infrastructure, and enable conventional forces. This definition addresses Direct Action and UW’s shortfalls. It emphasizes strategic targets and SOF’s enabling role in large-scale conventional conflict. It also gives planners creativity and flexibility in how they accomplish the sabotage. Any domain or action is viable if it disrupts strategic enemy systems. Defining strategic sabotage as a core activity gives it organizational emphasis that USSOCOM lacks. This will push the organization into a supporting mindset rather than the supported role it has recently filled. The United States will be ahead once conflict begins if it integrates strategic sabotage into planning now.

Spider’s Web

Modern large-scale conflict reinforces strategic sabotage’s necessity. Ukraine’s Operation Spider’s Web illustrates this. The Ukrainian Security Service (SSU) used low-cost explosive drones to conduct a deep penetration strike on Russian strategic bomber assets. The operation’s targeting, planning, and execution fit the proposed strategic sabotage definition and show why it must be a core activity. The SSU targeted four strategic Russian air bases deep inside Russian territory. Targets included Tu-95, Tu-22M3, and Tu-160 bombers, A-50 airborne early warning and control aircraft, training facilities, and repair centers. This shows a strategic and systematic targeting approach that ensured the Russian bomber fleet would be thoroughly disrupted. The SSU spent eighteen months planning and laying the operation’s logistical framework. Operatives used unwitting Russian truck drivers to smuggle small strike drones, launch systems, and explosive payloads deep into Russia. They used precise intelligence on structural weak points to ensure the drones would cause maximal damage. This planning’s specialized, long-term, and detailed characteristics encapsulate strategic sabotage.

Spider’s Web’s execution and strategic effects highlight strategic sabotage’s importance. Ukrainian operatives exfiltrated Russian territory and remotely launched the drones from the unwitting drivers’ trucks positioned at Russian airbases. The drones bypassed air defenses and struck over forty aircraft, equating to around thirty-four percent of Russia’s strategic cruise missile delivery platforms. This crippled Russia’s ability to sustain missile attacks and directly supported conventional forces targeted by those bombers. The operation exemplifies strategic sabotage. Specialized forces used clandestine methods and intelligent targeting to disrupt a strategic system, create dilemmas, and enable conventional forces. The United States must implement this operational style to succeed in conventional conflict.

Conclusion

To sum up, strategic sabotage must be defined as a USSOCOM core activity. The current core activities are insufficient to create the effects needed in a large-scale conventional conflict. During World War II, strategic sabotage enabled conventional forces and created Allied freedom of action while hindering Germany’s. Modern case studies like Spider’s Web illustrate strategic sabotage’s continued effectiveness when prioritized and executed. The United States must return to this focus. USSOCOM must establish strategic sabotage as a core activity to succeed in future conflicts.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of War or the United States Government.

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