Rethinking Counterinsurgency: A Police-Centered Approach

Introduction: The Problem with Conventional COIN

U.S. COIN doctrine, with its detailed field manuals and interagency frameworks, remains caught up in its reliance on building national armies—often exacerbated by misalignment between military and civilian efforts and the neglect of law enforcement resources. U.S. civilian agencies like the Department of State, Department of Justice, and others are often poorly structured or insufficiently resourced to sustain long-term stabilization operations. As a result, military-led nation-building frequently proceeds without the cultural insight or political sensitivity required for lasting success.

The “Green Zone” in Baghdad is emblematic of this failure. It was a fortified sanctuary for international personnel that reinforced physical and psychological separation from the Iraqi people.

As Rep Dennis Kucinich pointed out during a House sub-committee meeting on winning the hearts and minds in Iraq, “The perceived dissonance between American rhetoric and actions breeds mistrust at home and in Iraq about why we are there and how long we will stay…when we forget why we are there, when we forget it is their revolution not ours, we allow ourselves to be portrayed as arrogant agents of empire rather than as trustees of noble ideals.”

Rather than fostering legitimacy, the Green Zone signaled occupation and reinforced insurgent narratives of Western weakness and decadence. It implied that U.S. and staff hid safely behind the “wall” enjoying their typical decadent luxuries regularly shipped in from the West.  Meanwhile, their military lackeys and highly paid mercenary contractors persecuted the God-fearing Iraqi people over access to oil.

At the more local level, while working in Iraq, my colleague was approached by a tribal elder who needed a village irrigation canal repaired. The elder pointed out that a new power plant was being built nearby and that the bulldozer required for the repair work sat idle most of the time. Recognizing an opportunity to build goodwill and strengthen local relationships, my colleague attempted to secure permission and funds to use the equipment—but was ultimately unsuccessful. Contractors and untrained Department of State personnel failed to grasp the significance of the canal to the village’s survival and the strategic value of responding to the elder’s request. This reflects a broader, longstanding weakness in U.S. COIN strategy: a lack of local context and the inability to recognize small, practical projects as valuable counterinsurgency opportunities.

This is precisely where empowered, community-focused police forces could make a difference. Local police—who interact daily with the population and are more attuned to immediate community needs—could serve as a critical interface in identifying and prioritizing such projects. In this case, a village police commander could have flagged the irrigation repair as a stabilization priority, framed it as a public safety concern, and worked through civic liaison officers to escalate the request. In a properly structured police-centered COIN framework, police forces linked to stabilization advisors and aid programs would be positioned to recognize and act on small-scale, high-impact projects like this, turning missed opportunities into tangible trust-building wins. This paper does not propose that a police-centered COIN model should replace all others, nor does it attempt to address every operational detail involved in counterinsurgency. Rather, it advocates for more civilian-led and politically informed management, while prioritizing development of local police and government actors as key pillars of long-term success. In places like Afghanistan, where tribal structures, remote terrain, and minimal contact with the central government present significant challenges, police-heavy frameworks may be unworkable.

Equally important is the realization that in some environments, such as parts of Afghanistan or Somalia, no practicable COIN strategy may exist at all. Therefore, the government leaders must do a better job of assessing whether the outcome is strategically achievable. David Kilcullen, a leading COIN strategist, has explicitly noted that in environments deeply fractured by ethnic divisions and lacking any viable governance structures—such as parts of Somalia or Syria—deploying U.S. forces “boots-in-country” seldom achieves the desired shift in local allegiances. He emphasizes that without pre‑existing political will, durable institutions, and sufficient troop levels sustained over a long campaign, conventional COIN interventions are unlikely to create meaningful stabilizing effects.  Knowing when not to fight is just as essential as knowing how to fight.

Why Local Police Matter More Than Armies

As the primary interface between the government and the population, police play a critical role in COIN. Unlike armies, which are designed for external threats, police operate within communities—enforcing the rule of law in ways that directly influence legitimacy and everyday security.  Professor Hy Rothstein, COL, U.S. Special Forces (Ret.), of the Naval Postgraduate School has pointed out that the law enforcement community is skilled in handling criminal elements and organized narcotics.  These elements use the same tools and techniques—if on a more limited scale—as insurgent  forces. Local and national law enforcement know how to deter, disrupt and dismantle these gangs and to bring them to prosecution. This “law enforcement function” should be a core COIN function—not an afterthought.  Conversely, conscripting teenagers into the army, transporting them across the country, and expecting them to be effective at interacting with the local population is asking a lot.  This may be low cost and serve to protect the soldiers and their families from retaliation, but they may not speak the local language or climate, have no real stake in the community, and significantly reduces their effectiveness.

Visibility and Trust: Local police patrols can stop to talk with shopkeepers in a neighborhood market, asking about security concerns and listening to complaints about recent thefts or militia harassment. Rather than conducting aggressive searches, the officers focus on casual conversations, showing respect, and offering advice. Over time, this regular, low-pressure engagement builds relationships and trust, signaling to the community that security forces are present to serve and protect rather than intimidate.

Police run can sports tournaments, after-school clubs, or simple soccer matches for neighborhood children, creating a visible, positive association between state security forces and the next generation. Over time, families see the police as protectors of the community rather than distant enforcers.

Intelligence Gathering: Community-based policing yields more actionable human intelligence than transitory military patrols. Each interaction is an opportunity to reinforce the government’s legitimacy and fairness, countering insurgent narratives and gathering valuable human intelligence in the process. Trust-based relationships allow local police to gather human intelligence passively and routinely—information that would be impossible for foreign military units to collect without creating resentment.

Sustainability: Police forces can sustain localized security with less long-term cost and foreign dependency. Unlike military units, police are inherently community-based and are viewed as domestic authorities rather than foreign occupiers. Local police are familiar with community norms and languages, can enforce laws and resolve disputes in ways that are culturally appropriate—something foreign forces and even other host nation forces often struggle to do. This makes them more effective for long-term COIN efforts aimed at restoring and maintaining legitimacy.

Legitimacy: Locally accountable police undermine insurgent narratives by being present and responsive. Insurgents often frame the government as distant, corrupt, or illegitimate, exploiting gaps in local security to position themselves as alternative authorities. When community-based police are consistently visible—walking patrols, responding quickly to incidents, and addressing everyday concerns like theft, harassment, or disputes—they directly challenge these narratives.

Their physical presence signals that the government cares about local security, while their responsiveness shows that civilians can seek justice and protection through official channels, not insurgent courts or militias. For example, when a shopkeeper’s complaint about extortion results in a prompt police investigation—or when officers assist in resolving a land dispute rather than ignoring it—residents see the state as engaged and relevant.

Over time, these small, repeated acts of service erode the insurgents’ claims to legitimacy and demonstrate that the government’s presence is not limited to distant military bases or political elites but woven into the fabric of everyday life.

Rapid Reinforcement: National militaries still play a vital role as a reaction force when crises outpace police capacity. While police are essential for sustaining everyday security, there are moments when localized forces are overwhelmed—such as large-scale attacks, coordinated insurgent offensives, or natural disasters exploited by hostile elements. In these situations, police units may lack the manpower, firepower, or mobility to respond effectively.

National military units provide the strategic depth to fill this gap. Rapidly deployable QRF elements—whether infantry battalions, air assault units, or armored columns—can respond to unfolding crises with speed and force that local police cannot match. For example, if insurgents stage a coordinated attack across multiple districts, military units can be airlifted to stabilize key areas, secure infrastructure, and reinforce threatened police outposts.

Importantly, militaries should not displace police but act as a supportive surge capability, designed to intervene temporarily when the situation exceeds normal policing thresholds. This allows police to maintain their role as the primary face of government security while military forces operate as a backstop during exceptional events—ensuring both resilience and legitimacy in the broader counterinsurgency effort.

The Failure of the Current Model

The current COIN model prioritizes building national armies over developing local policing and sound governance. This approach often creates top-heavy, regime-focused security forces while neglecting the community-level trust, accountability, and continuity that are essential for lasting stability. Effective COIN forces historically balance kinetic action and action to reduce insurgents’ ability to exploit various strategic gaps, which include:

Army-Centric Training: Failures in our foreign military exploits stem from policymakers who default to the conventional force-on-force strategies they understand, while missing the complexities of modern irregular warfare. That’s the oversimplified answer we keep getting wrong. Special Operations Forces (SOF)—especially the Army’s Green Berets—are built for these nuanced challenges, yet few policymakers truly grasp how to craft policies that support unconventional warfare effectively politically and with the conventional forces at their disposal.

Civilian Gaps: Agencies like the State Department, USAID, and Department of Justice lack the personnel models needed for long-term, embedded deployments capable of working with and influencing local civilian leadership. While these agencies are critical to rebuilding governance, justice systems, and civil society in post-conflict environments, they are not structured for the sustained, on-the-ground presence that successful counterinsurgency demands.

Unlike the military, which has rotation models, pre-deployment training, and logistics pipelines to support personnel in austere environments for months or years, civilian agencies often rely on short-term assignments, contractors, or ad hoc deployments. This leads to constant turnover, institutional memory loss, and inconsistent relationships with local leaders and other stakeholders. In many cases, diplomats or advisors rotate out just as they’re beginning to build trust.

Without a dedicated, trained cadre of civilians prepared for long-duration assignments at the provincial or district level, U.S. efforts to develop legitimate local governance and rule of law are undermined. Insurgents, who often exploit weak or absent local government, benefit from this inconsistency. Until agencies like State, USAID, and DOJ develop true expeditionary personnel models—including incentives for long-term service, appropriate training, and robust field support—their ability to shape and sustain local political progress in contested areas will remain limited.

Short Tour Lengths: High turnover disrupts relationships, erodes institutional memory, and weakens progress in any operational environment—but in counterinsurgency, these effects can be particularly damaging. In One Size Does Not Fit All: A Critique Of Comprehensive Coin Doctrine, Canadian Lieutenant-Colonel Cody Sherman, outlines that the challenge of rapid turnover “…is incompatible with the acquisition of cultural expertise,” noting that rapid rotations prevent the retention of deep local understanding, which is vital for effective long-term operations.

Building trust with local leaders, community members, and partner forces requires time and consistency. When advisors, diplomats, or military personnel rotate out every six to twelve months, hard-won relationships are lost, and incoming personnel must start from zero. Each handoff resets the relationship-building process, signaling instability and disinterest to local partners.

Institutional knowledge—like cultural nuances, local power dynamics, and lessons learned from prior engagements—is often lost during these transitions. Without mechanisms to retain and pass forward this understanding, the same mistakes are repeated, and long-term goals are delayed or derailed.

Worse, insurgents exploit this churn. They recognize that U.S. and coalition efforts often lack continuity and capitalize on the confusion and gaps that follow leadership or advisor transitions. Progress stalls, credibility fades, and the local population’s confidence in government institutions declines when they perceive foreign support as inconsistent and short-lived. In this way, high turnover doesn’t just slow progress—it actively weakens the legitimacy of the entire counterinsurgency effort.

Corruption & Politics: Police reform is inherently political. It’s not just about restructuring departments or retraining officers—it’s about shifting power, authority, and public trust within a society, often in fragile or contested environments. Local leaders, tribal elders, political factions, and even criminal networks all have stakes in how police operate. Attempting to “reform” such forces without understanding these local power dynamics risks failure or backlash.

Because of this, successful police reform requires embedded advisors who can build relationships, understand the informal power structures, and work alongside—not above—local leadership. These advisors must be patient, culturally aware, and politically savvy enough to guide reforms without being seen as imposing them. If foreign advisors dominate or dictate the process, they reinforce perceptions of occupation and delegitimize the very forces they’re trying to strengthen.

Instead, advisors should act as mentors and partners, helping local leaders shape reforms in ways that fit the local context, while still advancing principles like accountability, rule of law, and public service. This quiet, steady influence—rather than heavy-handed direction—is what ultimately builds sustainable, credible police institutions capable of supporting long-term counterinsurgency goals.

A New Approach: Embedded Community Security Teams (ECSTs)

Core Concept:

By deploying modular Embedded Civil Security Teams (ECSTs)—comprised of Special Forces elements, law enforcement advisors, civilian stabilization experts, and local interpreters—the U.S. can work directly alongside host nation police and government leaders, building trust and legitimacy from the ground up. Rather than positioning U.S. forces as occupiers or commanders, this model treats them as long-term partners focused on enabling local solutions to local problems. Properly structured and resourced, ECSTs provide a scalable, sustainable method to shift the center of gravity in COIN operations from military force to community security—linking policing priorities to tangible improvements, supporting local leadership, and fostering the relationships critical to undermining insurgent influence and achieving durable stability.

Deploy modular teams—composed of Special Forces, law enforcement advisors, and civilian experts—to embed directly with local government and police units. These teams act as long-term partners, not occupiers.

While U.S. Special Forces (SF) are highly effective at partnering with indigenous forces, assigning them as team leads within ECSTs may unintentionally reinforce a military-centric posture. An alternate approach would position SF in a supporting role—particularly during early-phase deployments or in high-threat environments—while civilian and law enforcement advisors lead the mission’s policing and stabilization focus.

Note: In some regions, ECSTs may even be led by military police units or select officers from Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) trained in police engagement—making the model scalable even where SOF is unavailable.

Composition:

In the initial phase, Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (SF ODAs) with language skills and cultural fluency should take the lead. Their ability to communicate effectively and understand local customs allows them to build relationships and establish trust critical to early counterinsurgency efforts. At the same time, they possess the requisite military skills for both defensive and offensive training and operations in the unconventional warfare environment.

A USAID stabilization expert should be embedded to coordinate police development with broader stabilization initiatives. This advisor ensures that police efforts are linked to visible, community-level improvements such as street lighting, infrastructure repairs, and public complaint systems—reinforcing both security and public trust.

A local interpreter and civic liaison should be part of the team to bridge language and cultural gaps while facilitating communication with community leaders. Ideally, this interpreter would come from the same region in which they operate, providing deeper local knowledge and helping to build trust with the population. Their role is essential for gathering local insights, managing perceptions, and ensuring that security efforts align with community priorities.

The Mission:

ECSTs should focus on training and mentoring local police in community policing principles, basic patrol procedures, and effective investigative techniques. Community policing emphasizes regular, non-confrontational interactions with civilians to build trust and legitimacy. Patrol procedures should prioritize visibility, approachability, and proactive engagement rather than reactive enforcement. Training in investigative techniques helps shift police behavior from reliance on confessions or intimidation to evidence-based approaches, enhancing professionalism and public confidence. Together, these skills create a police force that serves as a stabilizing, community-focused institution rather than an instrument of state control.

ECSTs should work with local police and civic leaders to build public trust and formal engagement mechanisms. This can include setting up community forums, complaint and feedback systems, and public safety committees that allow citizens to voice concerns and participate in shaping local security priorities. By creating consistent channels for dialogue and problem-solving, these mechanisms help foster transparency, improve police responsiveness, and reinforce the idea that law enforcement serves the community rather than ruling over it. Over time, these efforts strengthen the relationship between civilians and police, reducing the influence of insurgent groups and enhancing overall stability.

Local policing priorities should be directly linked to tangible U.S. aid projects such as street lighting, infrastructure improvements, and public complaint hotlines. This connection ensures that as police address community concerns, visible improvements reinforce their efforts and build public confidence. For example, when police identify poorly lit areas as crime hotspots, U.S. aid can fund lighting installations to address the problem, visibly demonstrating responsiveness. Similarly, police-supported complaint hotlines or neighborhood repairs signal to the community that security improvements are tied to concrete benefits, strengthening the legitimacy of both local authorities and the broader stabilization effort.

Deployment Duration:

To ensure continuity and effectiveness, key advisory roles—such as police mentors, stabilization experts, and civic liaisons—should be structured around minimum three-year deployments, rather than the typical six or twelve-month rotations common in military and civilian assignments. Longer deployments allow advisors to build genuine relationships, develop local knowledge, and follow through on reforms that require time and trust to implement.

Additionally, overlapping rotations should be built into the deployment model. Rather than replacing entire teams at once, staggered handovers ensure that incoming personnel are trained and integrated by those already in place, preserving institutional memory and reducing the operational disruption that typically accompanies turnover. This continuity is essential in counterinsurgency environments where progress is often slow and depends on sustained personal relationships and trust. Without this long-term presence, advisors risk repeatedly restarting efforts and undermining local confidence in the stability and commitment of U.S. support.

Scalability Strategy

ECSTs act as a train-the-trainer platform to develop local police mentors, with U.S. involvement tapering over time.

One of the most significant challenges to implementing multi-year ECST deployments is the potential disruption to career progression, professional education, and personal stability for both military and civilian personnel. Extended tours may prevent individuals from attending required promotion or specialized training courses, and prolonged time overseas can strain families and increase the likelihood of personal issues requiring command involvement.

To offset these risks, the U.S. should establish a dedicated stabilization career track that formally recognizes ECST service as career-enhancing, with credit toward time in grade, leadership development, and follow-on assignments. Modular deployments—such as overlapping 12- to 18-month rotations within the same team—can preserve continuity while reducing individual burden. Additional incentives, including special pay, guaranteed school slots, priority reassignments, and optional family accompaniment where feasible, can further offset the operational and personal costs of long-term service. By institutionalizing ECST participation as strategically vital and professionally rewarding, the U.S. can attract and retain high-quality personnel without compromising force readiness or career viability.

Host Nation Integration

Embedded Civil Security Teams (ECSTs) operate side-by-side with host nation leaders and police, not as commanders but as trusted partners focused on long-term stability. Their approach is built around daily joint patrols and collaborative planning with local officials, ensuring that operations are shaped by local realities. Training is tailored to the specific capacities and challenges of the host nation’s police and government structures, rather than imposed as a one-size-fits-all solution. Civilian and military liaisons at the U.S. embassy help secure political backing and ensure that field-level initiatives align with broader diplomatic objectives. Importantly, ECST progress is measured not by kinetic activity, but by benchmarks of trust, public perception, and local legitimacy—placing community confidence at the heart of their mission.

Strategic Enablers for Success

Effective COIN-focused police reform requires structural changes at the strategic level. A dedicated funding mechanism, administered under USAID, the National Security Council (NSC), or SOCOM, should provide fast-disbursing stabilization funds tied directly to local policing milestones, allowing flexible, on-the-ground response to emerging needs.

Metrics must also be revised—shifting focus from traditional military measures like body counts to outcomes that reflect genuine stability, such as crime clearance rates, public perceptions of safety, and levels of citizen engagement with local police. Existing doctrine should be rewritten to prioritize policing, transitioning from the conventional “clear-hold-build” model to a more sustainable “clear-hold-police” framework that centers on local law enforcement.

ECSTs should track the metrics like the percentage of contacts initiated by local community members versus those initiated by ESCTs and other COIN units; longevity of friendly local leaders in positions of authority; the number and quality of tip‑offs on insurgent activity that originate spontaneously from the population; and even economic activity at markets and shops.

Finally, establishing a deployable civilian cadre through long-term contracts and incentive programs would allow recruitment of experienced retired police officers, governance experts, and surge-capable USAID advisors who can embed for extended periods, providing continuity and expertise essential for long-term success.  These civilians can regularly train alongside Special Forces units as appropriate to build working relationships, improve knowledge and skills, and foster better working relationships.

Scaling Through Military Police and SFABs

To avoid overburdening Special Operations Forces, select US Army Military Police units can be restructured to support Embedded Civil Security Team (ECST) missions. These units should be equipped with community policing training, cultural literacy, and advisory skills focused on supporting internal defense and local governance.

Rather than short-term deployments, these military police units should operate on regional rotations with longer assignments, allowing them to build local relationships and apply specialized knowledge over time. By expanding the role of military police in this way, the U.S. can create a scalable, sustainable support force for local policing efforts without exhausting SOF resources.

Certain elements of Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) can be cross-trained in police development to provide additional advisory capacity in COIN environments. For example, SFAB personnel could receive specialized instruction in community policing methods, civil-military engagement, and basic investigative procedures, preparing them to support local police forces in areas where civilian advisors are limited or require augmentation. However, to maintain the focus on building trust and public legitimacy, these SFAB elements must operate under the direction of Embedded Civil Security Teams (ECSTs) and civilian leadership, rather than pursuing independent or military-centric objectives. This ensures that their support enhances the community-oriented mission rather than defaulting to traditional military approaches.

An SFAB team might assist local police with patrol planning or evidence collection techniques, but their efforts should always reinforce the guidance and priorities set by ECST advisors and civilian governance specialists, preserving the civilian face of security and reinforcing police, not military, primacy in the eyes of the population.

Civilian Leadership and the State Department’s Role

The U.S. State Department, particularly through its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), must serve as the interagency anchor for police development and stabilization efforts in counterinsurgency environments. INL is uniquely positioned to coordinate the disparate efforts of the Department of Justice (DOJ), USAID, and the Department of Defense (DOD), ensuring that policing, governance, and development initiatives are synchronized rather than working at cross-purposes. Beyond interagency coordination, State should manage multi-year stabilization contracts, establishing long-term partnerships with local security forces, governance bodies, and civil society organizations. By overseeing funding streams and program accountability, State can provide the continuity and structure necessary for sustainable reform.

To support these efforts, State should advocate for and institutionalize long-term advisory assignments of at least three to five years for civilian personnel, including police mentors, governance experts, and development specialists. Building trust with local leaders and communities takes time—rotating personnel every 12 months undermines relationship-building and interrupts progress. Historically, British colonial administrators often spent decades embedded in the same regions, gaining deep local knowledge and influence. While the U.S. need not replicate that model, establishing career incentives for American diplomats, advisors, and development professionals to specialize in regional stabilization roles is critical. A professional, long-term civilian presence is essential for achieving legitimacy-focused reforms that can outlast insurgencies and strengthen local institutions.

Lessons from other Conflicts

Several lower-profile U.S. engagements offer valuable lessons in alternative approaches to counterinsurgency. Notably, U.S. support for civilian-led security initiatives in Colombia, the Philippines, and El Salvador demonstrates the potential of police-centered strategies to stabilize fragile environments without overreliance on conventional military force. In each of these cases, advisory efforts focused on community policing, targeted reforms, and relationship-building rather than large-scale kinetic operations. These experiences highlight how empowering local police forces and embedding tailored advisory teams can disrupt insurgent and criminal networks in a more sustainable and politically acceptable way.

In Colombia, U.S. advisors embedded with the Colombian National Police to help stabilize rural zones previously dominated by FARC insurgents. By improving police presence and legitimacy in remote areas, the program limited FARC’s ability to recruit and maintain local control. The author was embedded with the Colombian Anti-Narcotics police providing combat military police training and guidance to improve the effectiveness of the police forces against violent narco-traffickers and FARC guerrillas.  Just as importantly, during this and other deployments to Latin America, we instructed host nation police and military forces in both the respect for Human Rights and the Rights of the Accused.

In the Philippines, U.S. advisors supported barangay-level community patrols that helped suppress insurgent activity with minimal military confrontation, illustrating the power of decentralized, community-focused security initiatives. In El Salvador, despite significant challenges, U.S.-supported police reform contributed to counter-gang operations, though endemic corruption remains a long-term obstacle. Taken together, these cases underscore that police-centered approaches—when properly resourced, embedded, and politically supported—offer a viable path to stabilization that avoids the pitfalls of militarized occupation.

Risks and Mitigations

As with any strategy, a police-centered COIN approach carries both traditional and unique risks that must be carefully managed. One of the most critical challenges is reducing corruption within local police forces. To address this, robust parallel vetting systems should be established to screen recruits and existing officers for criminal ties or insurgent sympathies. Public reporting mechanisms, such as anonymous tip lines or oversight boards, should be implemented to give civilians a way to report misconduct without fear of retaliation. Additionally, international aid must be tied directly to integrity benchmarks, ensuring that funding supports accountable institutions rather than fueling corrupt patronage networks.

Another key risk is insurgent penetration of local police forces. Estimates are that about half of the green‑on‑blue attacks in Afghanistan were carried out by Taliban infiltrators, and about 25 percent were a result of Taliban infiltration and/or coercion of Afghan forces.  To counter this, a multi-layered human intelligence (HUMINT) network should be developed, incorporating both police and civilian sources. Civic-military intelligence loops—where information from community policing efforts feeds into broader military and diplomatic analysis—can help detect and neutralize infiltration attempts early.

Political resistance in Washington also poses a potential obstacle, particularly from policymakers accustomed to funding large-scale military operations. To overcome this, Congress should be educated on the cost-effectiveness of police-centered stabilization, using small-scale pilot programs to demonstrate real-world impact and build political support for expanding these efforts.

There is also the risk of unintentionally fragmenting local police forces by focusing on specific vetted units. Analysis from the U.S. Institute of Peace highlights how supporting specific vetted units—like the Afghan Local Police (ALP)—can inadvertently foster elite capture, powerful subnational factions, and even insurgent influence, thus fragmenting broader security institutions rather than strengthening them.  To prevent this, coordination with national governments is essential. Vetted subunits should be framed as models of successful reform, not as independent entities, reinforcing the legitimacy of national structures while building localized capacity.

Finally, to avoid fostering long-term dependency on U.S. support, every program should include a clearly defined exit plan from the outset. Contrary to popular belief, exit plans from military conflicts do not require secrecy because transparency fosters public trust, strengthens strategic credibility, enables allied coordination, and prevents adversaries from exploiting uncertainty. While operational details may require classification, the broader plan—including goals, conditions for withdrawal, and timelines—should be openly communicated. This plan should establish transition milestones and conditions for withdrawing advisors and financial support, ensuring that local institutions are positioned to sustain progress independently over time. By addressing these risks early and systematically, a police-centered COIN strategy can remain both sustainable and effective.

Conclusion: A Smarter, Sustainable COIN Strategy

To succeed in modern counterinsurgency, the U.S. Government must pivot from build of fragile armies to placing much more emphasis on and empowering trusted local community actors. That means investing in local police—not as regime enforcers but as community servants capable of providing everyday security and earning public trust. When combined with embedded SOF or military police advisors, aligned civilian support, and genuine political buy-in, this approach offers a scalable, adaptable, and locally legitimate path to stabilization.

It won’t work everywhere. In environments without governance structures, cohesive communities, or credible local partners, this model may not gain traction. But where conditions allow, police-centered COIN can bridge the gap between foreign assistance and local ownership. In such places, it may mark the difference between perpetual conflict and the first real steps toward sustainable peace.

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