Disinformation as a Strategic Weapon: A Review of Active Measures by Thomas Rid

Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare. By Thomas Rid. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 120 Broadway, New York 10271. 2020. ISBN: 978-1250787408. 514 pp. $12.10 (Amazon).

In Active Measures, Thomas Rid delivers a meticulously researched and urgent history of political warfare, tracing the evolution of disinformation from early Soviet operations to the digital onslaught of the twenty-first century. He argues that disinformation isn’t new—it’s a refined tool of statecraft. “This modern era of disinformation began in the early 1920s,” Rid writes, as “‘political warfare’ grew and changed in four big waves, each a generation apart” (p. 6). Today, he notes, “private correspondence gets stolen and leaked…,” as influence operations exploit public division (p. 6). As strategic competition shifts toward perception and influence, Rid’s analysis offers essential context for understanding modern conflict.

Thomas Rid, a professor at Johns Hopkins University and expert in cyber conflict and intelligence studies, combines scholarly depth and journalistic clarity. He draws on declassified intelligence, archival material from the Soviet bloc, Western counterintelligence records, and media analysis to show how states, especially the Soviet Union and later Russia, weaponized information. The term “active measures,” taken directly from KGB terminology, serves as both the title and thematic backbone of the book, describing covert influence operations meant to deceive, disrupt, and delegitimize adversaries (p. 7).

The book’s core thesis is that successful disinformation campaigns function by blending truth and lies so seamlessly that the resulting narrative cannot be easily challenged without reinforcing it. Rid emphasizes that disinformation is “not simply fake information—at least, not necessarily. Some of the most vicious and effective active measures… were designed to deliver entirely accurate information” (p. 10). These operations, he explains, are most potent when they manipulate real facts and events to erode trust, spread confusion, and deepen divisions. For instance, a Soviet campaign in 1960 that distributed an entirely accurate pamphlet “TO OUR DEAR FRIENDS” about racial violence in the U.S. to African nations, presenting real events in a way that strategically undermined America’s global credibility during the Cold War (p. 137).

What sets Active Measures apart is its sharp focus on context and continuity. Rid doesn’t just recount events; he shows how disinformation strategies evolved alongside technological change, political shifts, and strategic aims. The book follows a chronological structure but builds thematically, drawing clear lines between Cold War psychological operations and modern digital campaigns. The reader comes away with a deeper understanding of how today’s influence operations, often driven by bots, memes, and social media algorithms, are rooted in long-standing doctrines and mindsets. Rid examines early Russian trolling campaigns, including fake activist pages, staged protests, and viral meme content. He argues that these efforts, despite their poor quality and linguistic flaws, proved effective in exploiting algorithmic amplification and societal division.

Rid stands out for his clear-eyed assessment of disinformation, avoiding romanticized or simplistic portrayals and emphasizing its inherent flaws and frequent ineffectiveness. He shows that these operations are rarely flawless, often clumsy, and even counterproductive. As he writes that “almost all disinformation operations are, in fact, imperfect by design…” (p. 9). This view shapes Rid’s analysis of Russia; he resists alarmism, emphasizing the threat while warning against exaggeration. He notes that Russia’s 2016 disinformation campaign, while disruptive, suffered from poor execution and internal dysfunction: some Russian units “even compromised each other’s operations” (p. 386). Rid warns that overstating such efforts risks empowering adversaries and misdiagnosing the real challenge. This balance of critique and caution enhances the book’s credibility.

Rid’s narrative is engaging without being sensationalized, supported by transparent sourcing and strong empirical grounding. The chapters on the 2016 U.S. election and the Russian “Internet Research Agency” are particularly effective in showing how digital tools have amplified old techniques (p. 397). Moreover, Rid deftly integrates technological developments into his analysis, making the book not just a history but a commentary on the evolving nature of information warfare.

While Active Measures focuses primarily on Soviet and Russian operations, it opens the door for further exploration of other actors such as China, Iran, and Western democracies. Its rich historical narrative may not offer a prescriptive roadmap for countering disinformation, but it lays a vital foundation for understanding its roots. Rid’s thematic scope is ambitious, though some recent and relevant cases, such as Russia’s 2014 gray-zone campaign in Crimea or the 2008 invasion of Georgia, receive limited coverage. These episodes would have complemented his argument well, as they exemplify how Soviet-style tactics have evolved through cyber tools, deniable proxies, and psychological operations. Still, their omission does not detract from the book’s overall value. Rather, it highlights the need for continued study—something Rid’s work ably inspires.

For students of special operations, particularly those focused on psychological operations, cyber tools, and gray-zone competition, Active Measures offers a vital conceptual foundation. Rid skillfully illustrates how state and non-state actors exploit cognitive vulnerabilities and perception itself as a domain of warfare. Through compelling historical analogs, from Cold War subterfuge to the digital battlespaces of today, the book connects past strategies to present challenges such as Russian information warfare in Ukraine and the online radicalization shaping transnational threats. While not exhaustive, its insights are deeply relevant to contemporary conflict. Ultimately, Active Measures is an essential and timely contribution. It challenges readers to think beyond kinetic operations and recognize how narratives, trust, and legitimacy can be weaponized just as effectively as missiles or drones. For the special operations community, and for any leader navigating the complexities of modern strategic competition, Rid’s work is a sharp reminder that today’s most decisive battles are often fought in the shadows, using tools far subtler than firepower.

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