Axis of Opportunists: The cracks in the Sino-Russian Partnership

Red Square triumphantly greeted President Xi Jinping in May 2025 to celebrate the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War, where he reaffirmed a “no limits” partnership with modern-day Russia. This loathsome collaboration seems an intimidating challenge for the United States and the West. After all, Russian and Chinese landmasses dominate Eurasia, and ostensibly these two autocratic states serve in a mutualistic relationship, where Russian resources stoke a massive Chinese economy, and Sino financial and diplomatic support enable a revisionist Russian Empire. Likewise, both nations find themselves isolated from the world community in the aftermath of COVID’s origins in Wuhan and Putin’s assault on Ukraine, leaving them little choice but to align. This marriage of convenience seems an obvious match on the surface, but there are multiple reasons to doubt and avenues for third parties to scuttle this relationship.

A parallel failed arranged marriage can be found in the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, where Russia once allied with the Third Reich in the run-up to World War II, similarly exchanging vital Soviet natural resources for German machinery and expertise. While China is not Nazi Germany, and this does not forecast conflict between the two Asiatic giants, it rather demonstrates that the framework for a “no limits” Sino-Russian partnership is of temporary convenience and a move to strengthen a weak façade, which in turn is a proactive gesture to the West. Both nations have significantly different cultures, and according to the ancient wisdom of Indian theorist Kautilya, Russia and China’s proximity deems them unnatural allies. While wedging them apart is easier said than done, American strategic leadership must understand the pressure points and potential fault lines in the Sino-Russian relationship. A brief examination of the historical tensions and resource and demographic imbalances will illuminate that any Sino-Russian cooperation is tepid, temporary, and masking underlying and mutual animosity.

Historic Rifts

A chief gripe of President Xi is rectifying the Century of Humiliation, and having China ascend to its rightful prominence in the world. As an enduring and commanding culture, China was a land of immense wealth and prestige prior to the Age of Discovery. But by the 19^th century, European powers gained the advantage over the Middle Kingdom, and the century of Humiliation was inaugurated by the Opium Wars and continued with pressured cession of lands via “unequal treaties.” In the ensuing chaos of conflict between the British Empire and Qing China, Russia absconded with Chinese Outer Manchuria and portions of Western China in four distinct giveaways (1858, 1860, 1864, and 1881).  These chunks of resource-rich land are collectively over 40 times the size of Taiwan. This also butted Russia right next to Korea and Japan, setting up the embarrassing defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Additionally, it cemented Moscow’s meddling in East Asian affairs for a century to come. In contrast, the United Kingdom gained Hong Kong in 1841, a small backwater island, transformed it into a global financial center, and cordially returned it to China nearly three decades ago. Russia exacerbated the Century of Humiliation, was unapologetically the greatest exploiter of a downtrodden China, and still possesses former Chinese territory on the scale of three and a half Californians.

These former Qing territories later served as a battlefield for a deadly skirmish between the Soviets and Red China. In 1969, underlying Sino-Soviet tensions boiled over, resulting in combat casualties along the Ussuri River dividing the nuclear states. Dozens lost their lives, no resolutions made, and for the remainder of the Cold War, it is believed that nuclear missiles from both sides were targeted at each other, in addition to the West. The United States was able to further exploit these fissures, with President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 (and Forrest Gump too), and played the communist juggernauts against each other’s disparate interests, aiding to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. Sino-Russian mistrust and irritable relations are currently only supplanted by a contemporary, perceived threat from the West, forcing historical rivals to make an unenthusiastic stand together.

Coveted Resources

Siberia connects Russia and China, and includes the former Qing territories, and is an underpopulated hinterland of resources. It abounds in energy, minerals, timber, and water – all of which China scours the globe for. Additionally, potential climate change brings the opportunity of melting permafrost, making access to these resources more economical and viable. Even more tantalizing, near the Chinese border, Lake Baikal rests beyond the parched Gobi Desert. Barely inhabited (by Chinese standards), Baikal is the deepest lake on the face of the globe, larger than Belgium, and holds over 20% of the world’s freshwater. A tantalizing prize just beyond the reach of the bustling population centers of Northern China. Planned Chinese pipelines to tap into Baikal have met considerable Russian and environmental pushback, evaporating plans to alleviate China’s water shortage. This area, adjoining former Chinese lands, was subjugated by the Russians a mere 400 years ago, a footnote to the neighboring Chinese civilization, who have claims to East Asia dating back 5,000 years. Indeed, hundreds of thousands of Asian people populate the Russian Far East, mixed with descendants of Russian pioneers and Soviet-forced transplants.

Tepid Partnership

Sino-Russian cooperation may seem like a great wall of collaboration when viewing staged military parades, but China has trotted a fine line in regards to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Not wanting to over-antagonize the West (yet), China has willingly purchased cheap Russian energy, but stops well short of combined military support. Russia, on the other hand, has resorted to courting North Korea for cannon fodder and ammunition. A far cry from the days when the Soviet Union was the salvation of revolutionaries and despots worldwide. This budding cooperation with North Korea may be another reason for China’s dyspepsia with Russia. The 38^th parallel serves as a buffer to China from the West, but an emboldened North Korea, buttressed by Russian tech, may prove more problematic to a China that prefers the status quo on the Korean peninsula. China likewise has been meddling in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence, with President Xi’s trips to Central Asia, where he has peddled the Belt and Road initiative, hoping to supplant Russian influence in the region. Most critically, the transition to junior partner to China is a sore spot for Putin and the Russian people, which is a point of contention ripe for exacerbation.

A Zimmerman Telegram Moment?

The German Empire attempted a similar realignment for a powerful adversary an ocean away. In 1917, Kaiser Wilhelm suggested that Mexico regain the American Southwest, lost 70 years prior, offering legitimacy and military support (as documented in the movie Three Amigos). The proposal backfired, as the secret communique was revealed by British diplomats in the infamous Zimmerman Telegram, resulting in further erosion of German support within the United States and eventual war against the Central Powers. The difference in this analogy is that the China of today is not the Mexico of 1917. On the contrary, China is increasing its military strength stupendously and doubling its nuclear weapons every few years. While Russia has burned through decades worth of Cold War stockpiles, it is reliant on starving foreign mercenaries and stalled out in a 4-year conflict with a neighbor it geographically outsizes by a factor of 28. China is on the rise, and Russia is on the back foot.

A potential China-Russia conflict is perhaps wishful thinking for Westerners, and itself is a scary prospect, as both nations have nuclear weapons. However, that does not mean that the West should ignore the natural and long-standing animosity between these ignominious neighbors. It would be inappropriate, provocative, and counterproductive at this juncture to offer to help China regain the lost Qing territories from an overstretched Russia. However, globally showcasing and highlighting the hypocrisy of adversarial land grabs in Ukraine or the South China Sea, while there is a legitimate argument on the Sino-Russia border, could prove an embarrassment to the autocratic pair. As Xi and Putin superficially hold hands, more effort and focus must be made to make that embrace as uncomfortable and awkward as possible, breeding suspicion rather than cooperation.

Conclusion

Russia, throughout history, has been an expansionist nation (and let’s be honest, so has the United States…and most nations at some point) – seeking territory at the expense of neighbors, while likewise fending off existential invasions nearly every generation. They have their reasoning for their paranoia. However, today’s Germans, French, Poles, or Finns show no desire to march on Moscow and conquer the Motherland. The West wants peace, stability, trade, and to end the needless bloodshed in Ukraine. If, however, a recalcitrant Russia continues to panic Europe, the blame lies at the feet of Putin for the expansion of NATO and the rearmament of the continent. If this dubious trend continues, the West must endeavor to sow seeds of discontent between the opportunistic alignment of Russia and China. The West needs to seek policies to foment disagreement between Russia and China, not drive them together. The “no limits” partnership is a loveless marriage of convenience, with each side likely to sell each other out if given a better deal. Therefore, strategic leaders must look at this seemingly monolithic partnership and recognize the fracture points, with eyes on expanding the tensions and eroding trust between the Russian and Chinese duo.

(The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, U.S. Space Force, or Department of Defense).

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