A Nuclear Iran Would Pose an Existential Threat to the South Caucasus

Iran’s nuclear program remains a focus of international politics with the announcement of the fifth round of talks between the US and Iran on limiting the nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of some economic sanctions. Since that announcement, current events have intervened and cashiered those tasks. In its attempt to forge a nuclear deal with Iran, the Trump administration has outlined the US position, which requires Tehran to terminate its enrichment program fully. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has criticized the demand that Iran stop enriching uranium on Iranian soil, while also expressing his doubts about the success of the talks. US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff argued that Iran should not be allowed to possess enrichment capabilities and declared such capabilities a red line. Iran’s official position, however, rejects the US demand and sticks to the traditional Iranian narrative that Tehran will continue the enrichment process with or without a deal.

The negotiations and divergent positions of both sides indicate that the outcome of the talks is unclear, and Iran’s nuclear program will continue to be a pivotal topic in international relations at least for the foreseeable future. Now that Iran has gained the tools and necessary knowledge of enrichment technology and is approaching the weaponization stage, it is unrealistic to think that Iran will completely terminate its enrichment capabilities without the pressure of a war or regime change. Structural realist Kenneth Waltz claims that if Iran becomes a nuclear power, it would bring a nuclear balance and stability vis-à-vis Israel in the Middle East. However, it is worth critically reviewing this argument in the context of the South Caucasus region, particularly Azerbaijan, as this challenges Waltz’s notions.

Analyzing Waltz’s Framework Through an Offensive Realist Lens

In his 2012 article “Why Iran Should Get The Bomb,” Waltz argues that trying to dissuade a country from seeking a nuclear weapon via sanctions and isolation does not yield a positive result, as the case of North Korea illustrates. Waltz formulates three end scenarios regarding Iran’s nuclear program. The first scenario is that Tehran might be compelled to end its nuclear program in the face of heightened international sanctions and diplomacy. The second outcome scenario is that Iran develops a breakthrough capability but stops short of testing a nuclear weapon. The third would see Iran conducting a nuclear blast test.

It’s worth mentioning the first outcome regarding the Iranian nuclear program outlined by Waltz – in particular that international sanctions and increased diplomatic pressure have failed to achieve a meaningful result – as even with the past nuclear deal, the JCPOA has not been able to fully stop Iran’s enrichment capabilities in exchange for sanctions relief. The second possible prediction that Iran will acquire the capability but not test a nuclear weapon can be applied to the current situation, as US Secretary of State Marco Rubio described Iran as on the “threshold of a nuclear weapon.” Waltz’s central argument is based on the assumption that Israel’s nuclear edge in the Middle East creates an imbalance, and that Iran’s intention is to provide a nuclear balance, thereby creating deterrence between Israel and Iran. However, considering Iran’s regional policies over the last decades, as well as its foreign policy instruments such as using surrogates and proxy forces to destabilize its neighbors and the entire region, one can argue that the notion of Iran’s possession of nuclear capabilities would create “stability” through a nuclear balance does not stand scrutiny.

Waltz also falls short in his argument that if Iran wants to acquire nuclear weapons, it is in order to improve its own security, not to improve its offensive capabilities. The ideological nature of the Iranian regime, alongside its expansionist foreign and security policies, challenges the Waltzian notion. Iran’s increasing ballistic missile capabilities and drone production (which are being used by Russia in Ukraine), coupled with the arming of its proxies such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas (which attacked Israel on 7 October 2023), is an indication that the Iranian nuclear program will facilitate Iran’s offensive nuclear capabilities.

Waltz also overlooks the domestic dimension and variables, meaning the imperialist tendencies within Iran, as well as variables in perception, such as the worldviews of the key decision-maker Supreme Leader Khamanei, and IRGC leaders. Moreover, Waltz’s argument that Iran is striving to ensure its own security if it wants to possess nuclear weapons is questionable in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, which has shown repeatedly that having a nuclear deterrent does not shield a country from attack and loss of territory via conventional means.

While structural realists view the international system as anarchic and see states as striving at a minimum to ensure their survival, the offensive realist perspective explains state behavior more accurately than defensive realism. In fact, the anarchic nature of the international system directs states to maximize security, and to do so, they have to maximize relative power. Regardless of specific threats, states will try to expand their power. As security is not guaranteed under the anarchic international system, states maximize power to ensure their security. States tend to maximize their power and influence in the absence of a specific military threat, as they do not know when a potential threat will arise.

As Mearsheimer argues, states maximize their relative power over other states because having a greater military advantage over other states ensures their security. The notion that Iran possessing nuclear weapons is about ensuring Iranian security and creating a nuclear balance fails to address the offensive nature of Iranian foreign and security policies in the region as well as its expansionist approaches. An offensive realist perspective explains Iran’s nuclear program strategy accordingly, as Iran’s track record and foreign policy instruments show it takes a hegemonic approach in the region to maximize its influence over neighboring countries and increase its relative power, thereby solidifying its position as a powerhouse. Waltz viewed Iran’s nuclear strategy vis-à-vis Israel in the Middle East, but a nuclear-armed Iran would have a very different geopolitical role in a region like the South Caucasus, sandwiched between two rogue, imperialist regimes – Russia and Iran – both with a historical, colonial appetite for the states squeezed between them. Considering Russia and Iran are strategic allies and share common geopolitical views of the West and of curtailing the foreign policies and agencies of the regional states in the South Caucasus, particularly Azerbaijan, a nuclear armed Iran will not create a balance but push the regional actors towards Russia against their will, considering that NATO membership following the events in Georgia and Ukraine is unlikely. According to Robert Gilpin, “as the power of a state increases, it seeks to extend its territorial control, its political influence, and/or its domination of the international economy”. Thus, a nuclear-armed Iran would engage in solidifying and maximizing its geopolitical goals and interests in its neighboring countries, creating more instability.

Iran’s Nuclear Program and Security Risks to Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus

The lessons of Russia’s imperialist war of aggression against Ukraine and Russian official narratives, such as the rejection of Ukrainian identity and statehood, are proof that Iran’s nuclear program and potential weaponization of it pose an existential security risk to Azerbaijan as an independent country and the South Caucasus region in general. Iranian imperialist inclinations and ambitions, coupled with a historical and political grudge towards Azerbaijani identity and statehood, as well as Azerbaijan’s location as the only country in the world sharing both land and sea borders with Russia and Iran, would put the country’s security at risk. In addition, Azerbaijan’s close ally, Turkey, which does not possess a military nuclear capability, will not be a counterweight in the geopolitical environment in which Azerbaijan might find itself, surrounded by two nuclear-armed imperialist states. Iran prefers a weak Azerbaijan on its northern border. Using Armenia and its irredentist policies against Baku, nuclear Iran might further embolden Armenian revanchist circles and destabilize the region. Iran may increase its attempts to destabilize Azerbaijan via proxy groups such as the Huseyniyyun brigade, as Tehran wishes to curtail and reduce Azerbaijan’s independent foreign policy by any means. In the event of a nuclear deal, even Iran will be able to use the lifting of sanctions to increase its political and economic role in Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus region, including via soft power and proxies. Thus, Iran reaching a nuclear agreement with the United States or acquiring a weapon both pose potential risks.

The Iran-Russia 20-year strategic pact, which was signed recently, also points to the fact that both Moscow and Tehran will further cooperate and stand against a Western role in the region. The increasing Iranian-Russian military cooperation in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine is also a point of concern, taking into account that both countries are heavily sanctioned internationally, and sanctions do not pose an obstacle to the growing trade and military ties between the two. Azerbaijan’s geopolitical and geostrategic position as a link between the West and Central Asia bypassing both Russia and Iran, creates irritants in Moscow and Tehran. Iran’s staunch opposition to Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization is evident in its stance against the Zangezur corridor, as Tehran does not want to lose leverage in the South Caucasus as Armenia’s close ally. The facilitation of the transfer of Indian weapons to Armenia and the transfer of Russian weapons to Armenia via Iranian soil, amidst reports that Iran sold more than half a billion dollars worth of weapons to Yerevan, also illustrates the fact that the Iranian regime continues to be a source of destabilization in the region. In short, a nuclear Iran allied with Russia cannot establish a nuclear balance in the South Caucasus region; rather it will increase security risks and pose an existential threat to independence, mainly of Azerbaijan and Georgia.

By analyzing Kenneth Waltz’s argument that a nuclear balance would represent stability in the case of Iran, this article considers Iran’s nuclear program in the context of the South Caucasus region, viewing Iran’s state behavior in foreign affairs through an offensive realist lens. Contrary to Waltz’s claim that a nuclear Iran would create stability and balance vis-à-vis Israel in the Middle East, this paper argues that it will not do so in the case of the South Caucasus, as both Russia and Iran share common foreign policy goals and are allies with deep seated imperialist ambitions towards countries like Azerbaijan. As Russia’s war against Ukraine shows, direct imperialist activities by a nuclear Iran cannot be excluded in the future, taking into account the strong expansionist, revanchist, and imperialist sentiments inside the country and the perceptions of its leaders. Overall, a nuclear Iran will increase instability in its neighborhood.

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