Chemical Weapons by Violent Non-State Actors in Combat

Abstract

While the use of chemical weapons by non-state actors in warfare is rare, several recent examples, by the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka and by the Islamic State in Syria, offer insight to potential future challenges that non-state actors may pose.

Introduction

Chemical weapons are currently being deployed in a number of ongoing conflicts, including by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in the Sudanese Civil War and by Russian forces in Ukraine. However, the danger of chemical weapons used by violent non-state actors (VNSAs) has been known for decades. Chemical weapons have a dangerous ability to cause mass casualty events; while still difficult to effectively create, they are significantly easier to produce than other CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiation, and Nuclear) threats. Many chemical agents can be readily supplied from industrial sources or simply purchased online. 

VNSAs have already employed chemical weapons for years. During the September 11th terrorist attacks, Al-Qaeda agents took control of American Flight 11 through the use of makeshift knives and commercial chemical compounds including Mace and pepper spray to incapacitate and drive back the passengers. Other notable examples include the infamous Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack on the Tokyo subway system in 1995, and the Scottish National Liberation Army (SNLA) deliberately contaminating vodka bottles with sodium hydroxide in an attempt to spread terror. 

Despite these incidents of chemical weapons in acts of terror, the use of chemical weapons in combat by VNSAs was initially exceeding rare, with the first recorded use occurring in 1990. Unfortunately, since then, the incidence of chemical weapon use by VNSAs has been an increasing threat in active warfare. 

The Tamil Tigers, 1990

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka, better known as the “Tamil Tigers”, was considered one of the most professional and dangerous terrorist organizations in the world. Founded in 1976 by Velupillai Prabhakara, the LTTE quickly proved itself to be a ruthless, extremely disciplined, and innovative organization. It pioneered the use of suicide bombers, female fighters, cyanide capsules, and even the use of cyber warfare. At its height, the LTTE had effectively formed a quasi-state within Sri Lanka, with armored and artillery units, a primitive air force, international relationships with a range of other terrorist organizations including Hamas, Hezbollah, and Al-Qaeda, offices/cells in at least 54 other countries, and an annual income of $200-300 million. Given the capabilities of this organization, the near-total victory that the Sri Lankan government achieved over the LTTE in 2009 is astonishing, though outside the scope of this paper.

Throughout its three decade war against the Sri Lankan government, innovation remained a core tenet of the LTTE. One of the most notable examples of this occurred on 19 June 1990, when the organization engaged in the first use of a chemical weapon by a non-state organization in warfare. As part of a wide-scale offensive in northeast Sri Lanka, a LTTE contingent of approximately 300 combatants besieged a Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF) military base in East Kiran. The garrison of 60 SLAF soldiers held out against constant pressure for 10 days, when a relief column was able to arrive and break the siege. 

On the final day of the siege, the LTTE engaged in a desperate last push against the defenders. At 0530, one of the SLAF commanders observed a noxious vapor blowing toward the camp. As it overcame the defenders, men fell unconscious. The commander reported “…there was no oxygen for me to breathe and I was having difficulty getting my breath, breathing was difficult…” While there was initially some confusion over whether the LTTE had delivered the chemical weapons via mortar shell, it appears more likely that they had used barrels of chlorine stolen from a nearby paper mill, cutting open the drums and letting the wind carry it to the SLAF positions. However, this tactic quickly failed. Although the SLAF had no chemical warfare protective gear, the garrison quickly adapted – the soldiers removed their t-shirts, dipped them in water, and used them as makeshift masks. A change in the wind also drove the gas back toward the enemy lines. When the relief column arrived at 0930, most of the ill effects had worn off. Although some men were briefly incapacitated, the SLAF garrison sustained no causalities from this incident. While this desperate attack – likely motivated by the imminent arrival of the relief column – failed, it is important to note that this incident is the first recorded use of a chemical weapon by a non-state actor in combat. 

Even though the LTTE considered other unconventional weapons – in one 1985 plot, the LTTE attempted to steal a supply of radium from a Jaffa hospital to airdrop into an SLAF camp as a makeshift radiological device – the LTTE does not appear to have significantly engaged in any further use of chemical weapons until its demise 19 years later. 

Tulza, 1992

During the Yugoslav Wars, the CIA noted that a large chlorine plant, containing over 500 tons of chlorine gas, was located in the heavily contested Tuzla area. Intelligence estimated that a mass release of the chemicals at the plant could result in widespread death within the 230,000 inhabitants living within 20 kilometers. While details are scarce, several analysts have suggested that Muslim forces in the area threatened to potentially release the industrial chemicals.

The use of chemical weapons in the wider Yugoslav Wars has been attributed to several state actors, but the true extent of such chemical weapon use remains controversial.

Islamic State, 2014

The Islamic State (IS), an apocalyptic, transnational jihadist organization that captured large sections of Iraq and Syria in the 2010s, bears several strands in common with the LTTE. An organization defined by its “ruthless pragmatism” that was effectively a quasi-state at the height of its power, IS also used chemical weapons in warfare – albeit far more often than the LTTE ever did. 

From 2014-2017 alone, IS used chlorine and mustard gas at least 76 times in combat situations. In one notable instance in July 2015, IS forces fired several mortar rounds at an opposing force in Syria, releasing low concentrations of mustard gas. IS targeted US forces with sulfur mustard shells in 2016 and 2017, to limited effect. Further attacks have also included the use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) augmented with chlorine gas. Simple improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have also been augmented with chlorine gas – IS was reported to have deployed dozens of chlorine IEDs throughout 2015. IS forces have also deployed chemical weapons via makeshift rockets, firing 19 chlorine-carrying rockets in February 2016, followed by a salvo of approximately 40 rockets containing mustard gas in March 2016. 

Even for well-funded, highly motivated, and technically savvy non-state actors like the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult, chemical weapons are difficult to produce and effectively deploy in an unsuspecting peacetime environment. Much like the LTTE, IS’s use of chemical weapons has been relatively primitive. Much like the Tamil Tigers, most of IS’s chlorine appears to have been requisitioned from local water treatment and fertilizer plants; IS’s supply of sulfur mustard was likewise obtained from the Misraq chemical plant and sulfur mine. All of these attacks were used on an ad-hoc basis, with mustard gas being the deadliest agent deployed; the psychological impact of these weapons was far greater than the impact of any actual causalities inflicted. Multiple studies have noted the severe long-term mental impact that chemical weapons may have on mental and psychological health.

However, the degradation of IS’s capabilities in recent years, as well as the increasing effectiveness of drones in warfare, has made it significantly less likely that IS will pursue expensive, difficult, and time-consuming chemical weapon development when drones offer a similar means of indirect fire support. 

Future Directions

However, the threat still remains and may even evolve in the future. A number of recent papers have brought up the disturbing possibility of future combatants combining the range and maneuverability of drones with chemical warfare. VNSAs across the world have rapidly embraced drone technology; they have proven particularly effective in ongoing conflicts such as the Sudanese Civil War. As these technologies become ever commercialized and readily available, the potential threat of VNSAs combining drone technology and chemical weapons on the battlefield is becoming ever more present.

Conclusion

While the use of chemical weapons by non-state actors in combat is a relatively new phenomenon, the examples of the LTTE and IS display several commonalities that may occur in future conflicts. Modern militaries should recognize and prepare for these risks, particularly in counterinsurgency operations. Chemical weapons deployed by similar organizations are likely to be crude and small-scale, deployed through explosives, primitive projectiles, or even wind dispersal, although there is a possibility of future drone use. Ultimately, it is likely that the psychological impact of these weapons will far outweigh any tactical advantage that they may confer. 

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