Venezuela’s Hybrid Threats: Why Evidence Architecture Matters for US Security

In early 2026, Venezuela remains a hybrid threat to the Western Hemisphere. The recent US capture of its strongman Nicolás Maduro Moros has not changed that basic reality. Authoritarian rule, criminal markets, migration pressures, and external influences undermine maritime security, finances, and regional stability. International reports document systematic repression, selective prosecution, and a largely hollowed-out separation of powers.[1] Electoral processes remain controversial, the opposition and media are under intense pressure, and constitutional guarantees are limited.[2] At the same time, Venezuela serves as a transit corridor for transnational organized crime. Reports and situation assessments show a shift in routes along the Mid-Atlantic corridor towards Europe, where semi-submersible platforms and other low-signature vessels bypass traditional bottlenecks.[3] Despite the guidelines issued by the International Court of Justice, the territorial dispute with Guyana over Essequibo continues to pose the risk of escalation in a region of growing energy policy importance.[4] The regime’s security services, political machinery, and protection rackets remain intact, and interim arrangements in Caracas have not resolved the underlying crisis. This creates a phase of ambiguity. Washington has removed the president but not the system that sustained him.

For the United States, this creates a situation in which internal security, energy supplies, supply chains, and the defense of a rules-based order in the Inter-American region are simultaneously under pressure. An effective response requires an evidence-based approach that integrates maritime operations, port integrity, financial pressure, human rights-compliant sanctions, and de-escalation mechanisms in the Essequibo region from the outset. Hybrid threats of this kind can only be contained if legal resilience and public communication are part of the planning from the outset. The first 72 hours after major events are crucial. Recent unilateral steps and hard-edged “oil or else” rhetoric make this even more important, because pressure without a visible evidentiary backbone risks eroding trust at home and among partners.

The recent presidential elections were overshadowed by arrests of opposition members, disqualifications, restrictions on civil society, and a lack of transparency in the counting and publication of votes. The Carter Center criticizes the process and questions the integrity of the announced results.[5] Amnesty International documented that the elections were followed by numerous arrests, recorded killings of protesters, and broad prosecutions marked by due process violations, obstruction of the defense, and digital repression.[6] Persistent shortages of basic goods and underfunded humanitarian programs are driving migration and straining host countries.[7]

In the overall assessment of political rights and civil liberties, Venezuela is classified as “not free.” Freedom House’s 2025 rating is 13 out of 100 points.[8] The rationale refers to systematic oppression, abuse of institutions, and a lack of transparency in government actions.[9] Security agencies, intelligence services, and pro-government groups take coordinated action against political opponents. The tactics include arbitrary arrests, harsh charges, solitary confinement, procedural obstacles for defense attorneys, and targeted stigmatization in the media. After the elections, protests were met with considerable violence. Reports document killings, torture, and abuse in detention.[10] Digital tools are used to suppress criticism, with apps and social media platforms being used as whistleblowing and surveillance tools. Taken together, these patterns explain why Venezuela is classified as “not free” and show how little the separation between government and judiciary matters in everyday life.[11]

In foreign and security policy, the government seeks support from Russia, Iran, Cuba, and China. This includes political support, technical cooperation, and elements of security assistance.[12] The US Intelligence Community’s annual threat assessment places these interdependencies in the context of broader regional developments and describes a situation in which authoritarian regimes collaborate with transnational networks and disinformation tools, thereby hindering sustainable cooperation with Western partners.[13] The dispute over Essequibo remains a source of ongoing conflict. In 2023, the International Court of Justice issued orders to stabilize the situation, calling on both states to refrain from exacerbating the situation and to avoid actions that could undermine the legal position of the other party.[14] These orders create legal cover against escalation to open violence, even if the political environment remains unstable.

Evidence Architecture and the 72-Hour Window

In practice, you only get political backing for maritime actions if the evidence is timely, reliable, and clearly documented from start to finish. That evidence should include electro-optical and infrared image sequences with time stamps, data and gaps from the Automatic Identification System (AIS), radio logs, precise geo-coordinates, flag verification and, where applicable, justification of statelessness.[15] For public communication, an edited excerpt with the most important evidence is required. This architecture must be in place within approximately 72 hours of a seizure. In many operations, it is precisely this time window that determines whether partners are still communicating with each other or have already disappeared back into their day-to-day business. The impact on reputation and deterrence increases with the speed with which coalition-ready facts are available. If you cannot put EO/IR imagery, AIS tracks, radio logs, and flag verification on one page within three days, your case is weak. In the current environment, where unilateral moves and hard rhetoric often dominate the headlines, fast and credible evidence is the only way to keep partners, courts, and domestic audiences aligned with what happens at sea.

Experience with cases in the Mid-Atlantic shows that parallel evidence packages and coordinated press releases increase legitimacy and accelerate insurer accountability. Human rights experts have made the same point in other contexts, warning that weak documentation and lack of transparency around enforced disappearances can cause irreparable harm for victims and families, which underlines why robust evidence management is not just a technical issue but a legal obligation.[16] In practice, that means staggered releases and clear guidelines for media and parliaments. The benefits are evident in cases where inconspicuous ships or semi-submersible platforms were confronted with solid evidence, causing the operators’ lines of defense to collapse early on.[17] The international legal framework is based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the relevant provisions of flag law and national jurisdiction.[18] Particular challenges arise in the borderline area between civil liability and criminal prosecution. Statelessness must be clearly proven and documented.[19] Cooperation with flag states shortens proceedings and reduces the risk of appeals. In the Essequibo dispute, the Court’s orders contain guidelines against measures that alter or extend the status quo and therefore advocate de-escalation mechanisms such as hotlines and coordinated conflict avoidance procedures along busy sea lanes and airspace.[20] These legal guardrails do not replace hard power or political pressure, but they define the space in which maritime actions can stand up to scrutiny once the first headlines have faded.

For defense planners and interagency partners, this means that legal advice and evidence management cannot be “added on” at the end of an operation. They must be integrated into planning, resource procurement, and training for maritime and hybrid operations from the outset. Only then can decisive action in the first seventy-two hours be turned into outcomes that survive in court, in parliament, and in coalition diplomacy.

Inside Venezuela’s Hybrid Threats

State Repression and Protection Racketeering

Internally, Venezuela exhibits characteristics of state protection racketeering. Security forces and pro-government groups offer selective protection and exercise repression, thereby shaping both political and criminal markets. Snyder and Duran-Martinez describe such arrangements as “state-sponsored protection rackets,” in which changes in political control or enforcement strategies can suddenly turn relatively quiet negotiations into open violence.[21] In the Venezuelan context, arbitrary arrests, torture, and digital repression increase the risk that changes in domestic or foreign policy pressure will lead to sudden escalations rather than orderly adjustment.[22] In the current post-capture ambiguity, this volatility is even more dangerous, because pressure can trigger abrupt shifts inside the regime without any guarantee that the outcome will be more stable or more democratic.

Transnational Crime and Migration

Venezuela continues to serve as a transit area for cocaine and other contraband. Actors are adapting their routes, using alternative corridors, and switching to routes that bypass traditional bottlenecks.[23] As documented by Reservistenverband (Bundeswher Reserve Association) in Loyal, current cocaine routes from South America to the US and Europe increasingly bypass traditional chokepoints. Venezuelan criminal networks have long been seen not only as a domestic political challenge but also as a hemispheric security problem, as they have links to regional trade routes and state actors.[24] Regional reports point to high interception costs and a variety of means of transport. Anyone familiar with the situation on the ground will see one thing above all else: the routes are becoming less frequent but more challenging. The picture points to learning curves within the networks and a shift towards less conspicuous sea routes, which place higher demands on sensors and indicators. For the United States, pressure in the Caribbean may lead to a shift in routes to other coasts, affecting price and purity in the domestic market and increasing the effort required to coordinate partners and conduct joint situation assessments on both sides of the Atlantic.[25] If Washington is seen as acting largely on its own, partners will be more cautious in sharing risk at sea, which makes shared threat pictures and verifiable evidence even more important.

More than four million people have left the country, putting pressure on neighboring states and the entire regional order.[26] BBC reporting has visualized the main routes of Venezuelan migration since 2019. For host countries, the outflow drives up the costs of border protection and social services and creates opportunities for smuggling networks that exploit these emergencies. Proper channels for those seeking protection are becoming more important, and humanitarian channels must be protected from the side effects of sanctions. Underfunding of international aid programs increases the risk that population movements will continue and new routes will emerge.[27] Lessing shows that comprehensive “mano dura” (hard hand) crackdowns against drug trafficking organizations tend to shift routes and increase violence rather than dismantle the underlying markets.[28] Unmanaged, these pressures also feed domestic narratives in the US and Europe, which can make it harder to sustain a common line on Venezuela if evidence and legal frameworks are not clearly explained.

External Support and Influence

The US threat analysis describes close links between authoritarian partners and regional actors, including information operations, security cooperation, and economic influence.[29] In Venezuela, cooperation arrangements combine technical support, training, and economic assistance.[30] These patterns make traditional leverage clumsy. They raise the bar for evidence management and public messaging if partners want to present a united front in countermeasures and deterrence. When Washington signals that it is willing to act alone, these same actors will test the gaps between US and European positions, which only increases the premium on solid evidence and coordinated messaging.

The designation of Tren de Aragua as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and the planned designation of Cartel de los Soles, which explicitly names President Maduro and senior officials as members of an FTO, illustrate efforts to isolate criminal political networks through the use of effective counterterrorism tools, even though the Cartel de los Soles is more of a loose network of corrupt government officials than a traditional cartel.[31] These designations create opportunities for influence but also raise expectations for consistent implementation in the financial and law enforcement spheres.[32] If those expectations are not met with visible cases and traceable financial action, the designations risk being read as political theatre rather than serious long-term strategy.

The Essequibo Risk

The International Court of Justice has brought the Essequibo dispute into formal legal proceedings and called on both sides to refrain from taking any steps that could exacerbate the situation.[33] In the context of large offshore investments, any step that could be interpreted as a unilateral statement of fact carries high reputational and liability risks. The US aviation warnings regarding Venezuelan airspace are causing additional operational concerns.[34] For the United States and its partners, this requires proactive crisis communication and hotlines between the relevant operational commanders. Clear documentation of incidents, a coordinated conflict avoidance process, and open communication with flag states and insurers can reduce misperceptions and limit escalation dynamics.[35] In the current climate of hard signals and mixed messages, disciplined incident reporting and visible respect for the Court’s orders are among the few tools that can keep miscalculation in the Essequibo area from spiraling into open confrontation.

Why This Matters for US Security

Internal Security

The shift of routes to the Mid-Atlantic and the use of low-signature platforms require closer cooperation between intelligence services, the Coast Guard, law enforcement agencies, and international partners. Without coordinated disclosure of key evidence, the deterrent effect diminishes as operators, insurers, and port processes are less compelled to take preventive measures. Over time, this increases the availability of illegal goods on the domestic market and places a burden on health and safety authorities. In a context where the administration sometimes acts and speaks unilaterally, only shared facts and verifiable evidence can keep partners willing to share risk and intelligence.

Energy and Economic Stability

The region is not a side theater. New offshore discoveries reported by CNN Climate and partner institutions turn it into a significant emerging oil and gas region.[36] Escalations in the Essequibo area, at sea, or in Venezuelan airspace would affect investment and logistics.[37] Clear, early documentation of incidents in these areas contributes to de-escalation. The combination of legal guidelines and technical conflict avoidance serves to protect legitimate economic interests and reduces the appeal of risky narratives about alleged violations.[38] Hard-edged “oil or else” rhetoric may generate short-term leverage, but investor confidence and allied support depend on the sense that incidents and responses are anchored in law and evidence rather than in improvisation.

Rule of Law and the Rules-Based Order

The designation of Tren de Aragua as an FTO and the proposed designation of Cartel de los Soles signal an effort to isolate criminal political networks through legal and financial instruments.[39] It is crucial that these measures do not end with symbolic lists.[40] They have to be sustained over years in financial and law enforcement practice. Follow-up measures against financial and logistical channels are needed, as well as targeted support for partner states in documentation and procedures. Linking sanctions policy to human rights issues increases legitimacy and minimizes collateral damage to the population and aid channels. It strengthens partners who want to align their systems with rule of law standards and pursue international cooperation against criminal networks.[41] These priorities are consistent with the US integrated country strategy for Venezuela, which prioritizes democratic governance, human rights, and regional stability.[42] In the shadow of unilateral actions and sharp rhetoric, consistent legal follow-through is what distinguishes a serious rule-of-law strategy from mere signaling.

Policy Options for the United States and Its Partners

The following five-pronged approach combines maritime law enforcement, port integrity, financial pressure, human rights, and de-escalation in the Essequibo region. Planners are familiar with the reflex to initiate operational measures first and “follow up with evidence later.” The following proposals address precisely this gap. The individual points are designed to be measurable and adaptable for joint and cross-agency implementation. They assume that partners can be brought along if the evidence architecture and legal rationale are strong enough, even when Washington’s broader posture appears unilateral.

Expansion of evidence-based maritime operations in the Mid-Atlantic. Joint or closely coordinated operations with European partners, where political conditions allow, the compilation of complete evidence packages within a short time frame, and the coordinated public naming of those responsible can increase the costs for networks and their state supporters while strengthening credibility with insurers, port operators, and courts. A growing proportion of seizures should be supported by complete evidence dossiers, and the time to joint publication should be reduced. Indicators include the proportion of seizures supported by complete chains of evidence and the average time from boarding the vessel to publication. In many operations, the problem is not boarding, but the path to joint presentation of the situation. In the current climate, shortening that path is essential if partners are to stand beside the US rather than behind it.

Secure ports and supply chains at key European hubs. Smart seals, traceable IT audit trails, and stricter insurance requirements can reduce smuggling rates and reduce incentives for corruption in port operations.[43] Success would be reflected in higher hit rates at hubs, documented cases where tampering is detected early, and the integrity of the seal chain along the entire route. Visible, law-based action in ports also helps reassure European publics that cooperation with US-led efforts is grounded in due process, not in open-ended pressure.

Target financial arteries and trade-based money laundering. Updated guidelines for financial institutions, new designations, and coordinated risk mitigation at correspondent banks should make trade-based money laundering more difficult without disrupting legitimate payment flows. Indicators include the number and scope of new actions, changes in bank behavior, and compliance with relevant insurance and due diligence requirements. Here, predictable procedures and verifiable casework can offset some of the mistrust created by unilateral sanctions narratives.

Implementation of a human rights-compliant sanctions policy. Sanctions should increase pressure on repressive regimes while protecting humanitarian channels. Reliable findings from human rights reports can be translated into targeted measures, while general licenses and close monitoring ensure that health and care aid programs are not inadvertently blocked. Relevant indicators include trends in documented violations, access to legal counsel, and the proportion of cases with a complete chain of evidence and documentation.[44] This is also where Washington can show that its approach to Venezuela is more than “oil or else” by making human rights and humanitarian safeguards visible in practice.

Supporting legal guidelines in the Essequibo conflict through practical de-escalation tools. Reaffirming the legal process before the International Court of Justice, establishing and using military hotlines, conducting coordinated conflict prevention exercises, and publishing transparent incident reports with time and geocoordinates can prevent incidents and clear up misunderstandings at an early stage.[45] A decline in the number of incidents, short response times from the hotline, and consistent adherence to agreed procedures for recording incidents would be important metrics. In an era of sharp signaling and contested narratives, this kind of disciplined transparency is one of the few ways to keep the Essequibo dispute inside legal and diplomatic channels.

The aim is to strike criminal and state-tolerated networks where they are vulnerable: at sea, in supply chains, and through financial flows. At the same time, the goal is to protect human rights and limit the risk of escalation in the Essequibo region without unnecessarily hindering legitimate humanitarian or economic activities. Done this way, pressure on Venezuela supports US security interests and the rules-based order rather than undercutting them.

Conclusion

Venezuela is an instructive test case of how hybrid threats can undermine regional security, economic stability, and the rules-based order. Even after the US capture of Nicolás Maduro Moros, the regime structure and most of the underlying risks remain in place, and the mix of hard unilateral moves and coalition language exposes tensions between pressure and the rule of law. The challenge is not only to respond to individual incidents, but to design operations from the outset that are based on evidence, law, and communication within the coalition. An approach that combines rapid, clear evidence with legal soundness and close coordination with partners can help to manage route shifts, misattributions, and domestic counter-mobilization. Transparent communication and graduated measures make the costs to networks credible and protect humanitarian channels. At the same time, they limit miscalculations in territorial disputes like Essequibo. In a moment of ambiguity and sharp rhetoric, this kind of evidence architecture is one of the few ways to keep pressure on Venezuela aligned with long-term US interests and with the expectations of partners and courts. For policymakers and defense experts in the US, this means treating evidence architecture, conflict prevention, and partner capacity building not as side tasks, but as integral components of security strategy in the Western Hemisphere.

Endnotes[1] Freedom House, “Venezuela,” Freedom in the World 2025, https://freedomhouse.org/country/venezuela/freedom-world/2025 and Human Rights Watch, “Venezuela,” World Report 2025, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/Venezuela.

[2] Ibid., Freedom in the World 2025, findings on political rights and electoral processes, ibid and World Report 2025, discussion of restrictions on the opposition, electoral authorities, and media.

[3] Verband der Reservisten der Deutschen Bundeswehr, “Keine Chance auf Sieg im Krieg gegen das Kokain.” Loyal. 22 October 2024, https://www.reservistenverband.de/magazin-loyal/krieg-gegen-kokain/.

[4] International Court of Justice, “Summary of the Order of 1 December 2023,” Guyana v. Venezuela.” 1 December 2023, https://www.icj-cij.org/node/203344 and “What’s the State of Venezuela-Guyana Tensions?” Inter-American Dialogue. 11 July 2025, https://thedialogue.org/analysis/whats-the-state-of-venezuela-guyana-tensions.

[5] “Carter Center Statement on Venezuela Election.” The Carter Center. 30 July 2024, https://www.cartercenter.org/news/venezuela-073024/.

[6] “Venezuela: Mehr als 2.000 Menschen wegen friedlicher Proteste in Haft.” Amnesty International. 8 August 2024, https://www.amnesty.de/mitmachen/urgent-action/venezuela-mehr-als-2000-menschen-wegen-friedlicher-proteste-haft.

[7] Op. Cit., “Venezuela,” World Report 2025, at Note 1.

[8] Op. Cit., Freedom in the World 2025, at Note 1 and  “Freiheitsindex in Venezuela bis 2025.” Statista. 8 July 2025, https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/1333506/umfrage/freiheitsindex-in-venezuela/.

[9] Op. Cit.,  Freedom in the World 2025, at Note 1.

[10] “Venezuela: Torture, Arbitrary Detention and Abuse of Dozens of Children Must Stir International Justice into Action.” Amnesty International. 28 November 2024, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/11/venezuela-tortura-abusos-contra-ninos-ninas/.

[11] Op. Cit., Freedom in the World 2025 and World Report 2025 at Note 1.

[12], “China, Iran, and Russia Will Intervene in Venezuela to Threaten U.S. Regional Hegemony.” Center for Maritime Strategy. 28 October 2025, https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/publications/china-iran-and-russia-will-intervene-in-venezuela-to-threaten-u-s-regional-hegemony/.

[13] Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 2025, section 617 of the FY21 Intelligence Authorization Act, p. 8. Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2025-Unclassified-Report.pdf.

[14] Op. Cit., Guyana v. Venezuela, at Note 4.

[15] Fedlex ( Swiss federal legislation database), https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/2009/416/de;  Klaus Schaefer, Erik Soeding, and Matthias Zeller, “Das internationale Seerecht – ein potentes Regelwerk,” Chapter 10 Jens Lehmköster and Dieter Ladischensky, Eds. in World Ocean Review 1., maribus gGmbH, https://worldoceanreview.com/wp-content/downloads/wor1/WOR1_de_Kapitel_10.pdf; and “Ending Statelessness: About Statelessness.” UNHCR, UN Refugee Agency, https://www.unhcr.org/what-we-do/protect-human-rights/ending-statelessness/about-statelessness.

[16] “Experts Urge Venezuela to Comply With International Law to Prevent Irreparable Harm to Victims of Enforced Disappearance.” 28 February 2025. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNHCHR, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/02/experts-urge-venezuela-comply-international-law-prevent-irreparable-harm#:~:text=The%20independent%20experts%20urged%20the,its%20humanitarian%20mandate%2C%20provide%20information.

[17] “U.S. Forces Hit Drug-Carrying Semi-Submersible in Caribbean Aerial Precision Strike,” https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/navy-news/2025/u-s-forces-hit-drug-carrying-semi-submersible-in-caribbean-aerial-precision-strike and Op. Cit., “Das internationale Seerecht – ein potentes Regelwerk,” at Note 15.

[18] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,https://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/legal/pages/unitednationsconventiononthelawofthesea.aspx.

[19] Op. Cit., “Ending Statelessness: About Statelessness,” at Note 15.

[20] Op. Cit., Guyana v. Venezuela, at Note 4.

[21] Rebecca Snyder and Angélica Duran-Martinez, “Does Illegality Breed Violence? Drug Trafficking and State-Sponsored Protection Rackets.” Crime, Law and Social Change. Vol. 52, no. 3, 2009: pp. 253–273, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-009-9195-z.

[22] Op. Cit., “Venezuela: Torture, Arbitrary Detention and Abuse of Dozens of Children Must Stir International Justice into Action,” at Note 10.

[23] Op. Cit., “Keine Chance auf Sieg im Krieg gegen das Kokain,” at Note 3.

[24] Luis E. Colmenares G., “Criminal Networks in Venezuela: Their Impact on Hemispheric Security.” Military Review. January-February 2016, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art012.pdf

[25] “Venezuela Crisis: Four Million Have Fled the Country, UN Says.” BBC News. 7 June 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-48559739 and Günther Maihold, “Europas Häfen und der internationale Kokainhandel.” Social Science Open Access Repository. 2024, https://doi.org/10.18449/2024a07.

[26] Ibid., “Venezuela Crisis: Four Million Have Fled the Country, UN Says,” at Note 25.

[27] Op. Cit., “Venezuela,” World Report 2025, at Note 1.

[28] Benjamin Lessing, Making Peace in Drug Wars: Crackdowns and Cartels in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

[29] Cynthia J. Arnson, Ed., Venezuela’s Authoritarian Allies: The Ties That Bind, Woodrow Wilson Center Reports on the Americas no. 43. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 2021: p. 33, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/LAP_210510-Venezuelas%20Authoritarian%20Allies-V5.pdf and Op. Cit., Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 2025, at Note 13.

[30] Op. Cit., Venezuela’s Authoritarian Allies: The Ties That Bind, at Note 29.

[31] Betsy Klein, Natasha Bertrand, Kevin Liptak, and Kylie Atwood, “Trump Administration Formally Designates Venezuela’s Maduro as Member of a Foreign Terrorist Organization.” CNN. 24 November 2025. https://www.cnn.com/2025/11/24/politics/venezuela-terrorist-designation-maduro.

[32] “Sanctioning Key Member of Foreign Terrorist Organization Tren de Aragua,” US Department of State, June 2025, https://www.state.gov/releases/2025/06/sanctioning-key-member-of-foreign-terrorist-organization-tren-de-aragua and “Terrorist Designations of Cartel de los Soles.” US Department of State. 2025, https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/11/terrorist-designations-of-cartel-de-los-soles.

[33] Op. Cit., Guyana v. Venezuela, at Note 4.

[34] Fred Clayton, “Trump Tells Airlines Venezuela’s Airspace is ‘Closed in its Entirety’ in Latest Escalation.” NBC News. 29 November 2025, https://www.nbcnews.com/world/venezuela/trump-airlines-venezuela-airspace-closed-entirety-tensions-rcna246422.

[35] Op. Cit., Guyana v. Venezuela, at Note 4 and, “U.S. Relations with Venezuela.” Washington, DC: US Department of State. 18 July 2024, https://2021-2025.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/; and Op. Cit., Guyana v. Venezuela, at Note 4 and Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, IF10230. 19 November 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10230.

[36] Laura Paddison, “Welcome to the planet’s newest oil frontier.” CNN. 10 November 2025, https://www.cnn.com/2025/11/10/climate/south-america-oil-gas-brazil-guyana-argentina-climate.

[37] Op. Cit., “Trump Tells Airlines Venezuela’s Airspace is ‘Closed in its Entirety’ in Latest Escalation,” at Note 34.

[38] Op. Cit., Guyana v. Venezuela, at Note 4 and Congressional Research Service, Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy at Note 35.

[39] Op. Cit., “Trump Administration Formally Designates Venezuela’s Maduro as Member of a Foreign Terrorist Organization” at Note 31 and “Human Rights Reports: Custom Report Excerpts, Venezuela.” US Department of State. 2025, https://2021-2025.state.gov/report/custom/753a0e496c/.

[40] Op. Cit., “Sanctioning Key Member of Foreign Terrorist Organization Tren de Aragua,” at Note 32 and “Terrorist Designations of Cartel de los Soles,” at Note 32.

[41] Trafficking in Persons Report 2025: Venezuela. 2025. Washington, DC: US Department of State, https://www.state.gov/reports/2025-trafficking-in-persons-report/venezuela/.

[42] Integrated Country Strategy Venezuela. 2022. Washington, DC: US Department of State, pp. 2–7, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/ICS_WHA_Venezuela_Public.pdf.

[43] Op. Cit., “Europas Häfen und der internationale Kokainhandel,” at Note 25.

[44] Op. Cit., “Venezuela,” Freedom in the World 2025 and “Venezuela,” World Report 2025, at Note 1; Op. Cit., Guyana v. Venezuela at Note 4; “Venezuela: Torture, Arbitrary Detention and Abuse of Dozens of Children Must Stir International Justice into Action,” at Note 10, and “China, Iran, and Russia Will Intervene in Venezuela to Threaten U.S. Regional Hegemony,” at Note 12.

[45] Op. Cit., Guyana v. Venezuela at Note 4.

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