President Trump’s Push for Bagram Air Base: Strategic Miscalculation or Political Posturing?

A symbolic push for Bagram risks a regional escalation drawing in Russia, Iran, and China.

Introduction

An old dispute has been rekindled by President Donald Trump. He demanded that the United States retake Afghanistan’s Bagram Airbase, formerly the region’s center of coalition logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism, during a recent news conference held in the United Kingdom. Abandoned during the chaotic 2021 pullout, Bagram has become a symbol of both the end of two decades of war and the limits of U.S. action. Mr. Trump views reversing it as a response to China’s increasing regional influence and conveys more than just military aspirations. Deeper concerns about America’s place in the world, the unsolved lessons learned from Afghanistan, and whether symbolic assets can take the place of sound policy are hidden beneath hyperbole.

Geopolitical Context

The importance of Bagram is rooted in its history and geography. Constructed with Soviet assistance in the 1950s, it served as the core of Soviet operations throughout the war of 1979–1989 and, after 2001, as the nerve center for the United States and NATO. When Mr. Trump presented it as a counter-China asset, he emphasized that its location at the intersection of South and Central Asia allows it access to Pakistan, Iran, and Western China. Reoccupation, however, would elicit considerably more than Afghan opposition. Tehran would strengthen its tactical cooperation with the Taliban, Moscow would see encirclement and rely on Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to prevent Washington from accessing other countries, and the Taliban would categorically oppose any U.S. involvement. A symbolic push for Bagram risks a regional escalation drawing in Russia, Iran, and China.

Operationally, retaking Bagram is a comprehensive campaign rather than a small-scale effort. According to analysts, billions of dollars, air lanes, and tens of thousands of troops would be required. Cheap drones would convert the facility into a besieged fortress rather than a platform for projecting power, and such deployments would expose U.S. personnel to Iran-backed militias, IS-K militants, and Taliban fighters. This contradicts Pentagon doctrine, which now favors distributed, adaptable basing over vulnerable permanent hubs. Reviving Bagram would overstretch already-distributed resources and bind Washington to the very intervention model deemed unsustainable following Iraq and Afghanistan. This would not restore U.S. credibility.

Military Feasibility and Operational Risk

Regaining Bagram would require a full-scale campaign rather than a tactical change. Tens of thousands of soldiers, extensive supply routes, and safe airways would be needed at a cost of billions of dollars and exposing American forces to asymmetric warfare. Both the Taliban and jihadist competitors, seeking legitimacy through resistance, will target U.S. soldiers because Kabul has been ruled by the Taliban since 2021 and under attack from Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K). Additionally, parties supported by Iran might organize, intensifying the battle and raising the stakes.

In the age of drones, fixed bases are particularly at risk. Cheap drones are now used by non-state players, such as IS-K and militias with ties to Iran, which could make Bagram a high-value target rather than a base from which to project force. In terms of strategy, this action runs counter to U.S. policy, which advocates distributed and agile basing in an effort to minimize vulnerabilities. In addition to overstretching American resources, between European commitments and China deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, reoccupying Bagram would bring back a model that was already discredited in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Domestic Political Calculations

Mr. Trump’s rhetoric on Bagram is directed both internationally and toward American voters. He appeals to U.S veteran communities who feel betrayed by the 2021 withdrawal by bringing up the base. To this community, reclaiming Bagram is a metaphor for “restoring pride” because, to them, it represents more than simply infrastructure, it represents twenty years of sacrifice. Mr. Trump’s threats that “bad things” will occur if Afghanistan resists are consistent with his larger political approach, which involves energizing supporters without committing to expensive policy and projecting toughness through ambiguity to keep rivals guessing.

However, the American people are still tired with Afghanistan. There is minimal desire for redeployment, according to surveys and congressional discussions since 2021. Another involvement in the Middle East would conflict with long-term goals, as U.S. strategy is currently moving towards the Indo-Pacific. As a result, Mr. Trump’s portrayal of Bagram appears less like a calculated strategy and more like political staging meant to contrast his own actions with former President Joseph Biden’s disorganized retreat.

Regional Implications

• China: Beijing could become closer to the Taliban if the U.S. returned to Bagram. Instead of containing it, this would encourage China to deepen its economic and diplomatic ties in Afghanistan by expanding CPEC projects and resource ventures.
• India: striking a balance would be challenging for New Delhi. India may be forced to balance greater connections with Washington against regional autonomy and tactful engagement with Kabul, even though a U.S. presence might provide leverage against China.
• Pakistan: Islamabad would consider reoccupation to be an immediate danger to its influence in Afghanistan. In order to strengthen its reliance on Kabul for strategic depth, possible reactions include intensifying proxy warfare, strengthening ties with the Taliban, and putting pressure on counterterrorism cooperation with Washington.
• Iran: A U.S. return would be viewed as provocative by Tehran. It may exploit Afghanistan as a new theatre of conflict, escalating coordination with the Taliban and bolstering broader regional opposition to U.S. hegemony. It is already suspicious of American bases in the Gulf.
• Russia: A U.S. re-entry would be seen by Moscow as an infringement on its security zone. Bagram’s reoccupation may lead to more robust pledges from the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and a military build-up in Central Asia, as it has positioned itself as a mediator with the Taliban since 2021. To offset American influence, the Kremlin could increase cooperation with China and Iran.

Diplomatic Channels and Strategic Alternatives

Although Washington has the means to protect its interests without reoccupation, Mr. Trump portrays Bagram as essential. Today, multilateralism, technology, and diplomacy provide more credible leverage than permanent bases in hostile environments.

Power in today’s world is not determined by holding on to fortified fortresses in adverse terrain, but rather by the ability to combine technology, alliances, and diplomacy with mobility.

One path is across Central Asia. The U.S. could get overflight privileges, logistics hubs, or restricted facilities by strengthening its relations with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, maintaining access while upholding Afghan sovereignty. Additionally, such actions would protect against Russia’s regional influence and China’s imprint.

Another route is through technology. Current Pentagon policy prioritizes accuracy and mobility, long-range drones, offshore platforms, and AI-enabled satellites offer continuous monitoring and strike capability without the drawbacks of terrestrial garrisons. Mr. Trump’s fixation on Bagram fails to acknowledge the progress made by the U.S. since 2021.

Lastly, international involvement increases legitimacy and distributes risk. The costs of unilateral deployments can be avoided by coordinating action against terrorism and drug flows through the United Nations, NATO, and regional forums. Multilateralism conveys a dedication to communal security rather than a longing for antiquated emblems.

Strategic Lessons

Mr. Trump’s pursuit of Bagram highlights the tension that exists between the need for physical power symbols and the demands of modern warfare, which is a common topic in U.S. policy. Bagram could evoke strong feelings, but securing policy in abandoned strongholds could lead to repeating past mistakes. Reoccupation would give adversaries opportunities; China, Russia, and Iran would exploit American overreach to bolster their own might. For allies, the message is equally clear: Mr. Trump’s remarks highlight how quickly Middle Eastern concerns can divert Washington’s attention and cause it to lose focus on the Indo-Pacific. In particular, Australia needs to prepare for such scenario and make sure that its own plan is not dependent on the political whims of the United States.

Conclusion

Mr. Trump’s demand to retake Bagram is more political spectacle than a calculated tactic. Although it disregards Afghan sovereignty, practical realities, and the balance of regional security, it appeals to hawkish voters and veterans. A U.S. return would be unfeasible and strategically expensive due to Taliban rejection, the likelihood of an asymmetric conflict, and potential reaction from China, Russia, Iran, and Pakistan.

The concept highlights a larger problem: America’s ongoing pursuit of symbols of strength to cover up more profound fears of decline. Power in today’s world is not determined by holding on to fortified fortresses in adverse terrain, but rather by the ability to combine technology, alliances, and diplomacy with mobility.

The lesson is obvious for Washington and its allies, including Britain, Canada, Germany, France, and Australia. Reoccupying the sites of previous conflicts is not the path to lasting impact; rather, it requires networks, crucial technologies, and multilateral legitimacy. The question is whether American leaders can finally put Afghanistan’s ghosts behind them and concentrate on creating a multipolar order in which strength is defined by strategy rather than symbolism.

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